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
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**PREPARING FOR THE NATO SUMMIT:  
WHAT ARE THE PIVOTAL ISSUES?**

William T. Johnsen  
Thomas-Durell Young



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Final Report

Preparing for the NATO Summit:  
What Are the Pivotal Issues (U)

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The NATO Summit will be held in January and many important issues require addressing, such as the full implementation of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept, enlargement of NATO's membership, future force structure, and the Alliance's command and control organization. The authors argue that the Alliance's new strategy does not need reviewing, but rather urgently requires full implementation. Relationships toward the east are needed, but not meaningless pseudo-memberships in NATO. The authors also contend that one of the key problems facing the Alliance's defense structures is the archaic defense planning system, based on meeting a now nonexistent threat. In its place, they propose a new planning methodology based on capabilities and/or interests. Finally, they discuss at length the current status of the command and control reorganization in the integrated military command and recommend additional reforms.

NATO Alliance; peacekeeping; New Strategic Concept;  
Central and Eastern European nations; force planning  
system; Main Defense Forces; European Community

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William T. Johnsen  
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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed directly to the authors by calling commercial (717) 245-4058/4076 or DSN 242-4058/4076.

## FOREWORD

The NATO Summit is fast approaching. Important issues which will directly affect the future of the Alliance will be discussed, and possibly acted upon, at this meeting. Yet, seemingly lost in the ongoing debate over peacekeeping and the crisis in the former Yugoslavia are other crucial issues which could have fundamental consequences for the Alliance. These matters include full implementation of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept, enlargement of NATO membership, future force structure, and assessing the Alliance's command and control organization.

Contrary to the thesis of some, the authors of this report argue that the Alliance's New Strategic Concept does not need to be revisited. The broad approach to security contained in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept meets the conditions of the new European security environment. The authors argue, instead, that two pivotal issues confront the senior leadership of the Alliance as they prepare for the summit to be held in January 1994: the requirement to reform the Alliance's now archaic defense planning system and the need to state clearly the prerequisites for the future membership of Central and Eastern European nations wishing to join the Alliance.

While some observers have concluded that NATO's enlargement is the paramount issue to be addressed at the summit, the authors believe that reform of the force structure planning system is equally important. If the Alliance is unable to reform its force planning system, then force structures, especially in the Central Region, may fall to the point where the Alliance's New Strategic Concept is in jeopardy. And, if the basic rationale for the existence of the Alliance falls into question, the issue of enlarged membership becomes moot.

This report meets an identified study requirement as established in the Institute's, *The Army's Strategic Role in a Period of Transition: A Prioritized Research Program, 1993*. This report was conducted with funding from the U.S. Air Force

Academy's Institute for National Security Studies, for which the Strategic Studies Institute is grateful.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this report as a contribution to the debate on the future role of NATO in a post-cold war Europe.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "John W. Mountcastle". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "J" and a long, sweeping underline.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE  
Colonel, U.S. Army  
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

## **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS**

**WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN** has been a Strategic Research Analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute since 1991. Commissioned in the Infantry, LTC Johnsen has served in a variety of troop leading, command and staff assignments in the 25th Infantry Division and 7th Infantry Division (Light). He has also served as Assistant Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as an Arms Control Analyst in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). LTC Johnsen holds a B.S. degree from the U. S. Military Academy and a M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Duke University.

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## **PREPARING FOR THE NATO SUMMIT: WHAT ARE THE PIVOTAL ISSUES?**

### **Introduction.**

NATO is in a predicament, but not the dilemma some may think. Preoccupied with NATO's role in the ongoing crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, some observers have failed to comprehend that the Alliance's principal, and still important, mission of collective defense is being seriously challenged by its own lingering inability to stop the "free fall" in its members' national force structures, particularly in the Central Region.<sup>1</sup> And, while these problems do not portend the immediate demise of the Alliance, they may be very damaging in the short term and possibly terminal in the long run, if not adequately addressed soon.

There are several reasons behind the Alliance's current force structure problems. First, NATO was forced politically to respond substantively to the new European security environment: especially, the initiatives of former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Second, following the disintegration of the Soviet Union and a widening world economic recession, Alliance members became intent on cashing in on the "peace dividend." As a result, most nations announced plans to reduce national force structures, particularly in what would become known as Main Defense Forces.

In an attempt to preempt uncoordinated unilateral cuts in force structure, the Alliance announced in May 1991 its future force structure organization. Logically, formulation of strategy precedes the determination of the ways and means to achieve strategic ends. However, in this instance, the Alliance hammered out its new strategy while it simultaneously examined the forces required to meet anticipated security conditions. Thus, in May 1991, the Alliance announced its intent to achieve significant force reductions and review NATO



command and control structures, absent an approved strategy.<sup>2</sup> But, because force structure changes and strategy were developed in parallel, both, in addition to security conditions, were in harmony when the Alliance's New Strategic Concept was released at the November 1991 summit in Rome.<sup>3</sup> Since November 1991 however, significant changes in the security environment of Central and Eastern Europe have continued, and the importance of Main Defense Forces, at least in the perception of some Central Region nations, has declined.<sup>4</sup>

Senior alliance and national officials have not been blind to this dilemma. In December 1992, the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) recognized the need to launch a review of the serious, and growing, gap between stated force structure goals and actual forces. Accordingly, it directed a review of the implications of changing levels of national forces on the New Alliance Force structure.<sup>5</sup> This ongoing Force Structure Review is being carried out at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), with the results scheduled to be presented at the December 1993 DPC meeting. This review will have short-term, as well as long-term consequences. In the near term, the DPC has directed that the "...conclusions of the final report be taken into account in developing the Alliance's 1994 Force Goals which we will consider next Spring."<sup>6</sup> Moreover, a successful review should provide the Alliance with sufficient long-term planning guidance so as to preclude for some time the need for another force structure review. As a consequence, the Alliance must ensure that it articulates accurately and realistically its force structure requirements.

Accomplishing this elusive objective will require NATO to abandon some aspects of its long-standing approach to defense planning. Specifically, the Alliance first must move away from its reliance on threat-based planning. Second, NATO must shift its emphasis from determining the numbers of forces that nations might provide, to articulating the capabilities that will be required to support the Alliance's New Strategic Concept.

This essay will argue that if the Alliance is to solve its current force structure dilemma and avoid a future repetition, it must

search for the *right* answers to the *right* questions. To frame the questions properly, one must return to the classical strategy formulation of ends, ways and means; that is, ensuring that ways and means (i.e., force structure) satisfy ends instead of driving the system. The right question, therefore, needs to ask, not how *many*, but rather, *what kinds* of forces are needed to support the New Strategic Concept.

### **Strategy.**

To answer the question first of what forces are required to support the New Strategic Concept requires an assessment of whether this document remains valid. Some officials and analysts may assume that given the significant changes in the European security environment since the Rome Summit in November 1991, a review of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept is warranted.<sup>7</sup> The authors do not share that view. Hardly 2 years have elapsed since this document's release, and while improvements in the strategic environment continue, too many uncertainties remain (for example, the eventual outcome of the devolution of the Soviet Union, the extent of democratic change in Central Europe, and the violence inherent in the "New World Disorder.") Consequently, a strong case can be made that the purpose, nature, and fundamental tasks of the Alliance set down in the New Strategic Concept remain unchanged. Accordingly, the strategy's general principles: a broad approach to security, protecting the peace in Europe, dialogue, cooperation, collective defense, and management of crisis and conflict prevention and guidelines for defense, are being implemented.<sup>8</sup> Hence, it is premature and unnecessary to initiate any moves to reassess the Alliance's strategy.

Additionally, revisiting the Alliance's strategy because of changes in the number of units available in the Central Region, alone, would be unsound. It makes no sense to adjust the Alliance's strategy every time force structure numbers change in one region of Allied Command Europe (ACE).<sup>9</sup> But, more importantly, this is not a question of an inadequate strategy, but whether nations in NATO's Central region have the national will to support the strategy.

Historically, finding consensus on a new strategy in NATO has usually been difficult. It also may be difficult to limit the terms of reference of a new review or the strategic precepts of the Alliance. As one could expect, 16 sovereign states could have diverging interests and controversial or divisive issues would have to be confronted. A brief historical example highlights potential consequences: reaching agreement on the strategy of Flexible Response, as codified in MC 14/3, took 6 years and resulted in France leaving the Integrated Military Command Structure. And, while the adoption of the New Strategic Concept was relatively quick and painless,<sup>10</sup> one should not assume that a future review would be also relatively free of contention. In short, the formulation of strategy is a matter not to be taken lightly, particularly as a means to solve nettlesome internal political problems that some member states have been incapable of settling themselves. Moreover, attempting to change strategy will not correct the fundamental issue of force structure free fall in the Alliance.

Although a reopening of the debate on the fundamentals of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept is not required, it may be necessary to expand on certain principles contained in the basic document to ensure its continued applicability to the evolving security environment. In fact, the Alliance already has taken such steps. Following the June 1992 North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Oslo, for instance, NATO declared that under the Alliance's broad approach to security, it was prepared to support peacekeeping operations under the responsibility of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).<sup>11</sup> Thus, a precedent exists for NATO to expand its missions and activities under the auspices of the New Strategic Concept. Indeed, as Secretary General of NATO Manfred Wörner recently pointed out "...the slogan 'out-of-area—or out-of-business' is very much out-of-date. We are acting out-of-area and we are very much *in* business."<sup>12</sup>

A need might also emerge to enlarge membership in the Alliance. NATO has been grappling with this issue since the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and former adversaries began clamoring for entry into the Alliance. There is, however, no need for a strategy review to address this issue.

Again, strong precedent exists for bringing new members into the Alliance (Greece and Turkey in 1952, Spain in 1982), and even for incorporating a former adversary (that is, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955). Admittedly, enlarging the Alliance has not always been a simple or easy process. Even under more benign circumstances, considerable time has been required to integrate fully new members (e.g., Spain).<sup>13</sup>

The future enlargement of the Alliance, particularly the incorporation of Central and Eastern European states without offending the sensitivities of Ukraine and Russia, will present significant challenges, but they are not insurmountable.<sup>14</sup> Perhaps this difficult process could be facilitated through the addition of key former neutral European states (e.g., Austria and Sweden<sup>15</sup>) as part of their future membership in the European Community (EC). Using EC affiliation as a way-station to entry into NATO could be a useful device to avoid alienating nations not yet invited to enter the Alliance.

The creation of a pseudo-associate status in NATO, as some have advocated,<sup>16</sup> while perhaps attractive on the surface, should be avoided. Frankly speaking, "associate" membership, in a collective defense organization, has no substantive meaning; either a state receives full protection under the Alliance's collective defense umbrella or it does not. Half-measures, which only blur rights and responsibilities, could be confusing for all parties and be used as an excuse to impede the transition of these states to full membership in NATO.

For example, one option under consideration would be to grant associate or affiliated membership under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but without the security guarantees contained in Article 5.<sup>17</sup> That is, "The Parties shall consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened."<sup>18</sup> Unfortunately, this option has two major flaws. First, acknowledgement of a right to consult naturally raises the expectation that action will follow discussions. But, the Article 4 option is being touted precisely because NATO nations are unwilling to extend the security guarantees that go with full membership. Second, if NATO nations make it clear

that only consultation will be available, then associate members will quickly recognize that their status in the Alliance is meaningless.

As these states want *full* membership in NATO, the Alliance needs to be forthright in stating its criteria for accession and should not encourage any misunderstandings regarding NATO's mutual defense *obligations*. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) may offer the best transition mechanism to full membership in NATO. While the Alliance has not yet seriously committed the NACC to playing such a role, the potential certainly exists. The NACC, founded as a means "...to develop further the process of regular diplomatic liaison and to build genuine partnership among the North Atlantic Alliance and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe,"<sup>19</sup> has been the established forum for extending dialogue, partnership, and cooperation with Central and Eastern European states since its first meeting in December 1991. There is no reason, should the Alliance desire to do so, that the NACC cannot evolve into the conduit for enlarging membership in the Alliance. However, for the NACC to do so, it must become more substance-oriented, if it is to be seen as a serious organization by eastern countries.<sup>20</sup>

Implicit in the assumption that the Alliance will be enlarged is the need for NATO to state clearly and forthrightly the standards for future membership.<sup>21</sup> Such criteria should include:

- Functioning democratic institutions;
- Proven respect for human rights;
- Possessing market economies;
- Renouncing the use of force to settle irredentist claims;
- Clear civil primacy over military in the formulation of domestic, foreign, and defense policies;
- A military capability for self-defense;
- A credible capability to participate in collective defense of the Atlantic Alliance;


- Demonstrating a clear understanding of the roles and responsibilities inherent in NATO membership and a firm commitment to fulfill those roles and responsibilities;
- Prior acceptance and implementation of NATO political and military defense planning systems and guidelines (e.g., NATO strategy, defense planning system, Defense Planning Questionnaires, common defense acquisitions, Standardization Agreements, Standard Operating Procedures, Allied Tactical Plans).<sup>22</sup>

The authors contend, therefore, that there are no compelling reasons to subject the Alliance's New Strategic Concept to a comprehensive and time consuming review. The document is essentially sound and sufficient precedents exist to effect requisite addenda. More importantly, a strategy review, or even the development of a new strategy, would not solve the current difficulties in the levels of Main Defense Forces in the Central Region. Rather, the solution to this problem is located where one should expect to find it: in the force planning process itself and how the process is, or is not, used to implement the New Strategic Concept.

### **Force Structure.**

The announcement of a new Alliance force structure following the May 1991 DPC meeting served notice that the Alliance was responding to the changed security environment in Europe. The final communique of the meeting laid out the basic architecture of future Alliance forces, which, henceforth, would consist of Rapid Reaction, Main Defense, and Augmentation forces.<sup>23</sup>

Reaction Forces (see Figure 1) would include Immediate (i.e., an augmented ACE Mobile Force—Land and Air) and Rapid Reaction forces (i.e., the new ACE Rapid Reaction Corps—ARRC—see Figure 2). Additionally, for the first time, Standing Allied Naval Forces Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), Standing Allied Naval Forces Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) and Standing Naval Force Channel



**Figure 1. ACE Reaction Forces.**

(STANAVFORCHAN) were designated Immediate Reaction Forces and would fall under the command of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) in times of crisis. As envisaged, reaction forces would be composed of active duty formations maintained at a higher state of readiness that could respond quickly in time of crisis.<sup>24</sup> Thus, under the new force structure, the SACEUR would have the capability to respond quickly and flexibly to crisis developments on land, in the air, and at sea.

Main Defense Forces form the bulk of the future force structure. Built around a combination of national and multinational units, these forces are charged, in conjunction with Rapid Reaction Forces, with the immediate defense of Alliance territory.<sup>25</sup> Depending on varying national circumstances, Main Defense Forces would consist of a mix of active and mobilizable formations, with the ultimate ratios depending on specific national circumstances.<sup>26</sup>

On NATO's northern and southern borders, the size and readiness of Main Defense Forces could vary considerably—smaller forces in the north and increasing




Figure 2. ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (LAND).




numbers as one progresses from west to east along NATO's southern tier.<sup>27</sup> In either case, Main Defense Forces consist largely of national forces, reinforced by multinational or national formations from within Europe, as well as from North America. Within the Central Region, Main Defense Forces, reduced significantly from cold war levels, will rely more heavily on mobilizable units with longer readiness times, and were to have been reorganized into six multinational corps, plus one national German corps in eastern Germany (see Figure 3).

By relying on multinational formations,<sup>28</sup> NATO leaders hoped to demonstrate that the Alliance had moved away from the cold war "Layer Cake" alignment of national corps along the now defunct Inter-German Border. NATO leaders also envisaged that the establishment of standing multinational formations would manifest continued Alliance solidarity.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, the unstated and unofficial hope of many NATO planners was that reliance on multinational forces might impede the "force structure free fall" already underway in the Central Region as nations sought to maximize the peace dividend.

Augmentation forces are charged with providing operational and strategic reserves for the Alliance. As such, they are not dedicated to a particular region. Augmentation forces will be composed largely of national forces not charged with rapid reaction or main defense missions, and would be capable of reinforcing rapidly from less threatened areas of the Alliance. Such forces would be held in varying states of readiness, but NATO will depend heavily on mobilizable forces for the most part. And, while augmentation forces could come from anywhere within the Alliance, NATO would rely largely on reinforcements from the United States and Canada.<sup>30</sup>

Implementation of this new force structure has had mixed results. At their May 1993 DPC meeting, Defense Ministers expressed satisfaction with the progress in establishing ACE Rapid Reaction Forces<sup>31</sup> and, apparently, few problems have developed in the Main Defense Forces on NATO's flanks (Allied Forces Northwest Europe—AFNORTHWEST—and Allied Forces Southern Europe—AFSOUTH). Within the



**Figure 3. Original Plan for LANDCENT\*.**

Central Region, however, there has been a precipitous fall in planned national contributions to Main Defense formations.

This condition stems from a series of closely linked issues. Implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty is resulting in large scale reductions of key treaty limited items of equipment (see Figure 4). Concomitantly, an intense desire to reap the peace dividend derived from the demise of the Warsaw Pact, the implosion of the Soviet Union,


Country	Battle Tanks	Artillery	Armored Combat Vehicles
BE	25/7.0%	56/15.0%	282/20.0%
CA			
DE	66/15.8%		
FR	37/2.8%	68/5.0%	357/8.5%
GE*	2834/40.5%	1897/41.0%	5474/61.4%
GR	144/7.7%	30/1.5%	
IT		189/8.8%	619/15.6%
NL	170/18.6%	230/27.5%	387/26.4%
NO	35/17.0%	4/1.0%	
PO			
SP	60/7.0%	63/4.5%	
TU	28/1.0%		
UK	183/15.3%		17/0%
US	1898/6.5%	109/4.2%	375/6.5%
TOTAL	5480/21.5%	2646/12.0%	7511/13.0%

\*Includes equipment from former East Germany

**Figure 4. CFE TLE Reductions.**

and subsequent absence of a European-wide threat facing the Central Region further drove down perceived force structure requirements. As a result, by 1997, according to NATO sources, the overall military strength of the Alliance will have fallen 25 percent from 1990 levels. Yet, this number conceals significant geographic disparities. In the Central Region, air and ground forces will realize reductions of about 45 percent.<sup>32</sup> Thus, only five multinational corps may be available for Main Defense Forces, and then only by the widespread use of dual-hatting many units (see Figure 5). Indeed, the severe reductions of Main Defense Forces, particularly in the Central Region, precipitated action in the DPC during its December 1992 meeting to initiate "... a review of the implications of changing force levels for the new force structure."<sup>33</sup>

The DPC is concerned because, in designing their post-cold war force structures, nations within the Central Region have failed to take into account other demands that could require larger national contributions than apparently



**Figure 5. LANDCENT Ca 1995?**

envisaged. Specifically, they appear to have chosen to ignore a key provision of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept: the requirement to provide support to, and reinforcement of, areas outside the Central Region that may exceed the capabilities of the ACE Rapid Reaction Forces.<sup>34</sup> In other words, for the first time, Main Defense Forces from the Central Region may be needed as reinforcements for other ACE Major Subordinate Commands—MSCs (i.e., AFNORTHWEST and AFSOUTH)—therefore requiring the maintenance of force levels larger than some have anticipated for strictly national or regional defense in the Central Region.

National contributions to Main Defense Forces in the Central Region may require further reexamination. For example, units will have to be structured differently than in the past to meet new and challenging deployment and sustainment requirements. Moreover, if nations in the Central Region are to meet reinforcement requirements, then they may not be able to relax readiness states as much as many initially anticipated. Nations also may have to reconsider their historical reliance on conscription because of the many constraints on the employment of conscripts outside national territory or the Central Region. Elimination of conscription, however, may not be the right answer. Should nations reduce reliance or eliminate conscription (e.g., as Belgium and the Netherlands are currently considering<sup>35</sup>), they may face an ironic twist that could affect their ability to meet force goals. Long-term service professionals must be paid substantially more than the

conscripts they will replace. Hence, personnel costs will undoubtedly increase in an era of shrinking defense budgets, reducing the number of personnel that can be retained on active status. Nations, therefore, will have to create a delicate balance in the number of personnel available, as well as in determining an appropriate readiness status that meets national fiscal constraints and NATO requirements.

### **Force Structure Planning.**

The question facing NATO force planners is not whether nations in the Central Region need to man seven Main Defense Corps, but how better to articulate a rationale that will convince Central Region nations to maintain the requisite force structures needed to give substance to the principles outlined in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. Recent failures to establish such a rationale stem from two primary causes. First, NATO has continued to rely on an outmoded force structure planning system that focused on the "threat." That "threat" no longer exists and, within Central Europe at least, the Alliance has yet to identify sufficient risks to justify maintenance of significant forces in the Central Region.<sup>36</sup> Simply put, threat-based planning is no longer viable.

Second, the existing force planning system focuses on numbers and types of units that nations would be requested to provide.<sup>37</sup> In the past, this system coincidentally provided roughly the capabilities needed to face the massive numerical superiority of the Warsaw Pact. However, the capabilities of yesterday are not necessarily the capabilities required of today and tomorrow. For example, many national force structures within the Central Region relied heavily on conscription and mobilizable forces that, by law, could not be employed either outside national or NATO territory.<sup>38</sup> Similarly, some nations possess only fixed logistics infrastructures that could support a campaign on the North German Plain, but which cannot be moved, as envisaged under the Alliance's New Strategic Concept, to support another geographic area within NATO.<sup>39</sup> A new emphasis, based on the capabilities of forces—rather than numbers of units that a nation brings to the defense structure—will assume greater importance.

Difficulties currently being experienced in Central Region force structures go beyond simply numbers. Therefore, a new basis for force structure planning will be required to remedy the situation. The authors understand that changing any significant bureaucratic policy and system that has functioned for 40 years will be an extremely difficult task, particularly when consensus must be achieved among the widely differing national perspectives of the Alliance. That said, and despite space limitations, the authors wish to offer brief outlines of two possible alternatives that might contribute to the ongoing debate over future force structure planning. For purposes of this essay, the two alternatives will be referred to as capabilities-based planning and interests-based planning.

*Capabilities-Based Force Planning.* First, planners would identify potential missions that NATO forces might be required to perform in the foreseeable future.<sup>40</sup> While NATO planners engaged in day-to-day activities undoubtedly have a better perspective on potential missions, some examples might include rapid reaction, main defense (by region and nation), peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, military-to-military contacts, crisis response and management, and humanitarian assistance. While by no means exhaustive, this list provides a flavor of the range and scope of missions that might be required.

Second, force planners would derive operational mission capabilities or requirements needed to perform the respective missions. Development of the operational concepts essentially would identify: What must be accomplished? Where must it be done? When will the mission be performed? How many times may the requirement have to be repeated? Answers might include, to follow through with one example: Deploy ACE Rapid Reaction Forces, anywhere within ACE, on less than 2-weeks notice, capable of conducting three deployments simultaneously, and being able to reconstitute Immediate Reaction Forces within 72 hours. Other operational mission concepts should be developed in a similar manner. Again, NATO planners would be best placed to identify, develop, and articulate such mission requirements statements.

Third, operational mission requirements would be used to determine appropriate national contributions to Alliance defense structures. These contributions include both those forces that might be needed to fulfill national requirements (e.g., demonstration of national sovereignty, local defense, defense of overseas territories, U.N. commitments.), as well as to fulfill guidelines laid down in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept and supporting documents such as MC 400, "Military Guidance for the Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept" (e.g., ACE Rapid Reaction Forces, Main Defense Forces, Augmentation Forces, infrastructure).<sup>41</sup>

Fourth, military planners would develop "credible contingencies" to assess the abilities of forces to accomplish the stated operational mission requirements. By way of example, NATO planners could use something similar to the Illustrative Planning Scenarios used in the yearly Department of Defense Planning Guidance.<sup>42</sup> Certainly, the authors recognize that the development of "credible contingencies" may be difficult within the Alliance.<sup>43</sup> That said, such an effort may produce a more dependable and politically tenable system than continued reliance on an outmoded and politically unacceptable threat-based force planning.

Fifth, specific force structure options for appropriate operational mission requirements could be developed for each member of the Alliance. These options would then be assessed at the national and aggregate Alliance level to determine whether sufficient capabilities had been generated to fulfill the operational mission requirements. If gaps between requirements and capabilities are identified, NATO military planners, in conjunction with national authorities, would take the steps necessary to eliminate disparities. If a gap could not be closed, a risk analysis and assessment must be completed to determine further actions required (e.g., redefinition of the operational mission requirement, acknowledged shortfall, reallocation of Alliance resources) to remedy the situation to the maximum possible extent.

*Interests-Based Force Planning.* A second alternative for a force planning system is interests-based planning. The general thrust of this rationale is that even in a period of no perceived

direct threat to national or Alliance security, enduring interests remain that must be promoted during times of peace, and defended against potential, if largely ill-defined, risks. These interests are manifold, but, due to space constraints, the following will serve for purposes of illustration.<sup>44</sup>

The broad interests of NATO begin with the survival of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance as free and independent nations, with their fundamental values intact and people secure. To fulfill this interest, force structures must:

- Deter aggression, and should deterrence fail, repel or defeat military attack on terms favorable to the Alliance and its members;
- Provide a hedge against instability in Europe and along its periphery;
- Balance military potentials; and,
- Effectively counter threats to citizens of the Alliance, short of armed conflict.

A second overarching interest is healthy and growing national economies that ensure opportunities for individual prosperity and protect the national resources of member states. Military forces contribute to this enduring interest by securing Alliance or national geo-economic interests, for example, in the Middle East, where NATO members have already demonstrated a commitment to defend economic interests (e.g., the Western European Union [WEU] and the United States during the 1987-88 "Tanker War" and the Gulf War coalition of 1990-91).

A third enduring interest is contributing to a stable and secure Europe, fostering political freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions. In this case, Alliance forces could be called upon to participate in peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations, to support collective security arrangements within Europe under the sponsorship of the CSCE, to carry out collective defense missions, as required, or to participate in humanitarian relief operations.




Once interests are identified and appropriate military missions are agreed upon, an iterative process similar to steps two through five of the capabilities-based planning system outlined above is then used to determine the appropriate levels of national force structure contributions and the aggregate requirements of the Alliance.<sup>45</sup> Similarly, risk assessments could be conducted to determine any gaps between requirements and resources, and how those disparities are best resolved.

*Synchronization of Strategy and Force Planning.* Regardless of the force planning system eventually employed, it is important to synchronize strategy and force planning. In other words, NATO must follow a sequence that ensures that force structure planning flows from the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. Only in this manner can the Alliance ensure that ends (strategy), ways and means (force structure planning) are synchronized, strategic requirements are articulated, and standards clearly set. Without such explicit standards, the Alliance runs the risk of an accelerating "force structure free-fall" in the Central Region that could eventually undermine the Alliance's New Strategic Concept, and ultimately the capability to continue to collective defense; NATO's *raison d'être*. Should this occur, NATO will have established its irrelevancy to the changed security environment and contributed to its own demise.


#### **Command and Control Structures.**

Closely related to NATO force structure issues is the question of what command and control structures are needed to direct those forces. The Alliance is currently in the midst of rationalizing and reorganizing its command structure to conform to the plan endorsed at the December 1991 meeting of the DPC. The implementation of the command reorganization is scheduled to be completed on January 1, 1995.<sup>46</sup> In essence, the Alliance intends to reduce the number of Major NATO Commands (MNC) from three to two (see Figure 6). Additionally, AFNORTHWEST (a Major Subordinate Command [MSC] of ACE) is in the process of being created by merging Allied Command Channel ([ACCHAN], formerly a

### *Old Structure*



### *New Structure*



**Figure 6. Major NATO Commands.**

MNC), Allied Forces Northern Europe ([AFNORTH], a MSC of ACE), minus the geographic area of the Baltic Approaches ([BALTAP], a Principal Subordinate Command [PSC] of AFNORTH), and United Kingdom Air Forces ([UKAIR], formerly a MSC of ACE—see Figure 7).<sup>47</sup> Moreover, the Alliance has the objective of reducing the overall manning strength of its headquarters by 25 percent.

Despite the extent of these planned reductions and reorganizations, NATO will retain a large command and control apparatus. In the words of Canadian Rear Admiral B. Johnson,




Figure 7. AFNORTHWEST Command Structure.

Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT), "Whatever one might say of NATO's command structure there is undeniably lots of it."<sup>48</sup> Given Admiral Johnson's observation, some might call for another reexamination of the Alliance's military command and control architecture. While acknowledging that this recommendation has merit, given the politically-charged nature of this issue, it would be unwise formally to review command structures until after the current reorganization has been completed.

In any case, efforts to make rational and needed changes to these structures will inevitably face considerable challenges. NATO command and control structures represent important manifestations of political and military prestige, status, and influence in the Alliance. As a result, developing militarily sound structures, let alone finding political consensus to adopt these recommendations, will surely be a very difficult process. These conditions were certainly reflected in the debates leading up to the most recent reorganization.<sup>49</sup> While a formal review of these structures at this moment would be unwise, it is not too early to begin contemplating how command structures could be adjusted *after* 1995 to enable the Alliance better to meet its changing missions.

To begin, the current arrangement of the two MNCs, ACLANT and ACE, should not be tampered with. The distinct geographic and operational conditions of each theater lend themselves to the current division of responsibilities. From all indications, ACLANT requires no significant changes to its basic structure and, therefore, will not be discussed here.

Given the distinct geographic differences within ACE, the current division of the theater into three MSCs should remain intact. However, there may be a requirement to refine the operational boundaries between AFNORTHWEST and Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT). Under the provisions of the DPC-approved reorganization plan, the geographic area of BALTAP (essentially Denmark and Germany, north of the Elbe River) will pass to the command and control of AFCENT on January 1, 1994.<sup>50</sup> Both political and military rationales drove this decision. Politically, Denmark wished to be considered an integral part of Central Europe and Germany wanted all of its

territory located within one MSC. Militarily, the unification of Germany had greatly extended the AFCENT area of responsibility eastward and the defense of a unified Germany under one MSC made good sense. Significant inherent complications, however, have been apparent for some time. Under the terms of the plan, AFCENT would exercise wartime command and control of only air and ground forces in the geographic area of BALTAP (see Figure 8). At the same time, all maritime and maritime air forces and the entire geographic area of the Baltic Sea would fall under AFNORTHWEST.<sup>51</sup> This agreement unnecessarily complicates command and control arrangements between AFNORTHWEST and AFCENT and hinders CINCENT's (Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe) ability to plan and conduct a coordinated, combined tri-service defense of the Central Region.

To eliminate confusion, BALTAP, as a geographically-based PSC, should be dissolved, and its air and ground defense command responsibilities assumed by AFCENT's amalgamated, functionally-defined PSCs, AIRCENT and LANDCENT, respectively. Concurrently, a new Naval Forces Central Europe (NAVCENT) should be established, and responsibility for the maritime defense of BALTAP and the Baltic Sea should be transferred from AFNORTHWEST to AFCENT (see Figure 9).<sup>52</sup> This new command could be located at the current BALTAP headquarters at Karup, and could be commanded by a Danish flag officer.

Admittedly, such arrangements can be expected to meet with political opposition, especially given that the current command and control arrangements represent a political accommodation of divergent British, Danish, German, and Norwegian interests. Nonetheless, there are at least three good reasons for such a move. First, it makes little sense to constrain CINCENT's ability to plan for a unified, seamless defense of his area of responsibility. Second, NATO in general, but specifically AFCENT, must move away from the concept of geographic commands below the MSC level. The days of a limited security horizon, clear and distinct threats, and detailed geographic planning parameters have past. AFCENT needs to continue the formation of effective functional PSCs as a means





Figure 8. AFCENT Command Structure.



**Figure 9. Proposed Maritime Delineation Between AFNORTHWEST and AFCENT.**

of ensuring that Central Region forces are capable of supporting the Alliance's New Strategic Concept, instead of being artificially tied to less militarily significant geographic areas.<sup>53</sup> To be sure, forces in these countries need to be able to perform their Main Defense missions; however, they must also develop capabilities necessary to assist in the reinforcement of other regions.<sup>54</sup> Third, such an evolution would encourage further streamlining of command structures in a time of diminishing resources.

Changes in the command and control structures in the Southern Region also bear scrutiny. If one accepts the proposition that demands on Alliance military capabilities have shifted to the Southern Region, it would be prudent to encourage greater integration of command and control arrangements along NATO's southern tier. Essentially, the Alliance has to provide for the defense of the *entire* Mediterranean Sea and Italy, Greece and Turkey; three detached and expansive peninsulas. The immense geographic area, with its distinct cultural, political and physical subregions of AFSOUTH, argues against a more functional organization of its numerous PSC and Sub-PSC structures (see Figure 10). Moreover, two key NATO regional countries, Spain and France, do not formally fall within AFSOUTH command and control structures, but only maintain bilateral operational agreements with CINCSOUTH for certain missions (e.g., air defense).<sup>55</sup>

This does not imply that nothing needs be done in the Southern Tier. One important step would be continued encouragement of Greece to make good on its 1980 agreement with the SACEUR to establish Sub-PSC headquarters for 7th Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF) and Allied Land Forces South-Central Europe (LANDSOUTHCENT) at Larisa. The Alliance also should insist that PSC and sub-PSC headquarters throughout the Southern Region have the largest possible representation of international staff members. Finally, notwithstanding the difficulties inherent in such a project, the Alliance should replicate the example of the Multinational Division South (which is to comprise Italian, Greek and Turkish brigades) wherever possible. Such formations would work to break down cultural and political barriers of Southern Region states, encourage higher levels of competency and could be used to effect closer operational ties with French<sup>56</sup> and Spanish forces.

A final series of thoughts on the Alliance's Rapid Reaction Forces need to be considered. First, although the Alliance has extensive experience with reaction forces, going back to 1960 with the formation of the ACE Mobile Force, there are magnitudes of difference between moving essentially a






Figure 10. AFSOUTH Command Structure.

reinforced light infantry brigade throughout ACE, primarily to demonstrate Alliance resolve, and moving a self-contained corps of up to four division equivalents<sup>57</sup> throughout Europe for the purpose of fighting in support of a MSC commander. Obviously, transitional command and control arrangements from the SACEUR to the receiving MSC commander need to be developed, refined and exercised.

Second, Admiral Johnson has implied that, given SACLANT's modern command, control, communications, and information capabilities, the Alliance may wish to consider assigning SACLANT responsibility for controlling crisis management and deployed maritime operations throughout Europe.<sup>58</sup> While this may be true for deployed maritime operations (and that is an open question), this is certainly not the case for all crisis management operations. Rapid Reaction Forces are being developed for deployment predominantly in ACE, not ACLANT. Moreover, SACEUR is the designated commander of these forces, to include maritime (STANAVFORLANT, STANAVFORMED, STANAVFOR-CHAN) forces in time of crisis. Thus, Admiral Johnson's recommendation does not bear close scrutiny and NATO need not take up this issue. If, on the other hand, there are deficiencies in SHAPE's communications capabilities to support these missions, as Admiral Johnson infers, then these shortcomings should be addressed as a matter of urgency.

### **Conclusions.**

The Alliance's New Strategic Concept is essentially sound. Granted, the rapidly changing security environment in Europe continues to transform the strategic conditions facing the Alliance, but the existing strategy is sufficiently flexible to meet foreseeable challenges. Certainly, the Alliance may have to make provisions to expand the scope of operational missions (e.g., humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement) or enlarged membership, but these are not issues that call for the wholesale revision of the Alliance's strategy. Indeed, NATO is already responding to these issues within the context of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept.

The ongoing force structure review presents more difficult challenges as NATO planners prepare their report for the December 1993 DPC meeting. But, these challenges must be confronted. First, Alliance force structure planners should acknowledge that absent clearly defined risks in the Central Region, it is not politically feasible to sustain the argument articulated in December 1991 to retain seven Main Defense corps in the Central Region, even if the overwhelming majority are multinational formations.

Second, the absence of unambiguous risks to Central Europe and continued reliance on a force planning methodology that focuses on threats will undoubtedly cause force structures in the Central Region to continue plummeting. Thus, NATO force planners must adopt a new force planning system that conforms better to the new security conditions in Europe; that is, a system based on generating the capabilities required to implement the provisions of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. Moreover, NATO's adoption of such a planning system would greatly assist the individual nations currently grappling with how to adapt their national planning systems to the realities of the new strategic environment.

Third, formally adopting such a new system will not be enough. Regardless of the force structure planning methodology used, nations in the Central Region are not likely to produce levels of forces equal to the requirements generated by the ACE Force Structure Review. Thus, NATO force planners will face the unenviable task of confronting Central Region nations with shortcomings in their individual force structures: heavy reliance on conscription and legal impediments to the deployment of such forces outside national or NATO territory, neglected Combat Support and Combat Service Support capabilities that continue to tie forces to the narrow geographic confines of the "old" Central Region, a near total lack of strategic lift capability, inadequate intelligence acquisition and dissemination systems, and insufficient command, control, communications, and information systems.

Fourth, and perhaps most difficult, is the task of convincing nations, especially in the Central Region, to expend the political and fiscal capital needed to overcome these deficiencies and

support the full intent of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. Planners will have to reshape fundamentally the thinking of the last four decades that focused primarily on the defense of the Central Region and redirect those energies toward acquiring the capabilities needed to defend not only the Central Region, but all of ACE. Moreover, they will also have to overcome the inertia of the existing planning system and the natural hesitation to change what has worked for the past 40 years. None of these tasks is easy, but if the Alliance is to remain relevant to the future security environment in Europe, there is simply no alternative.

If NATO nations in the Central Region do not take the necessary steps to implement these reforms, they may jeopardize future U.S. military participation in Europe. Europeans must understand that this is not an extension of the old burdensharing issue that focused on dollars spent. Rather, this issue focuses on the fundamental question of whether Europe is viewed as willing to defend itself. Given the current political climate in the United States, the United States cannot be perceived as carrying a disproportionate role in the Main Defense Forces of the Central Region. Nor can the United States be seen as providing unbalanced proportions of reinforcements that might be required to support areas outside Central Europe. If this occurs, U.S. politicians—spurred on by economic concerns and public opinion—may conclude that Europeans are unwilling to provide for their own defense and, therefore, continue to reduce the U.S. forward presence in Europe.

Such a situation is in the interests of neither the United States nor Europe. The United States, therefore, must make it perfectly clear to its Central Region allies that U.S. forces are in the Central Region not simply to "defend" that region, but are centrally located within the European theater to cooperate with our allies in the defense of all regions in ACE.<sup>59</sup> Concomitantly, European allies must recognize the message, take the admittedly difficult steps needed to reform the NATO force planning system, and create the capabilities required to implement the vision contained in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept.

The Alliance must, therefore, ask itself the "right" questions. The Alliance must confront the difficult task of reforming its force planning system, rather than occupying its limited time and resources in specious arguments over what is a fundamentally sound strategy. What is more important is that the Alliance get back on the right track: use the principles and guidelines contained in the Alliance's New Strategic Concept to derive the appropriate capabilities and forces needed to turn strategic concepts into reality. It will not be an easy task, but it is not insurmountable.

#### **Recommendations.**

- The Alliance should proceed with the implementation of its New Strategic Concept. The Alliance should not conduct a time-consuming review of its New Strategic Concept, which would only draw attention away from the real crux of the forces structure dilemma—the outmoded force planning system.
- The Alliance should reform its existing force planning system by adopting a capabilities- and/or interests-based methodology.
- The Alliance, particularly Central Region nations, must acquire the capabilities required to implement NATO's New Strategic Concept.
- The Alliance should begin to consider changes in its command and control structures after 1995. Specifically,
  - Place the Baltic Sea under AFCENT and establish a maritime boundary with AFNORTHWEST between the Skagerrak and the Kattegat.
  - Eliminate BALTAP as a geographic-based PSC and integrate Danish and German forces into AFCENT's functional PSCs.
  - Establish a PSC Headquarters, NAVCENT under a Danish flag officer.

- Continue to urge Greece to establish Headquarters, 7 ATAF and Headquarters, LANDSOUTHCENT.
- The United States should take a strong leadership role in reforming the NATO force planning system.

## ENDNOTES

1. See, *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), January 28, 1993 for reports of officials' concern. For analytical background see, *Military Trends: Atlantic to the Urals*, Washington, DC: Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, December 9, 1992.

2. See, Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group, Press Communique M-DPC/NPG-1(91)38, Brussels, NATO Press Service, May 29, 1991.

3. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Press Communique S-1(91)85, Brussels, NATO Press Service, November 7, 1991.

4. Admittedly, there were very good political rationales for this sequence of events. France agreed only in February 1991 to participate in the Strategy Review (which commenced following the London Summit in July 1990), which naturally lengthened the process. Given the fast pace of political events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the articulation of new forces (i.e., Rapid Reaction, Main Defense and Augmentation), a plan to create Main Defense multinational corps and a revised command organization constituted the least the Alliance could do, given the circumstances. See, Agence France-Presse (Paris), March 8, 1991 in, *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-WEU-91-047*, March 9, 1991, p. 19; and, Thomas-Durell Young, *The Franco-German Relationship in the Transatlantic Security Framework*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, July 15, 1991.

5. Defense Planning Committee, Press Communique M-DPC-2(92)102, Brussels, NATO Press Service, December 11, 1992, point 9.

6. Defence Planning Committee, Press Communique M-DPC/NPG-1(93)36, Brussels, NATO Press Service, May 26, 1993, point 9.

7. See Brett Haan's op-ed essay in *Defense News* (Washington, DC), July 19-25, 1993. For additional opinions, see James Chace, "Exit, NATO," *The New York Times*, June 14, 1993, p. A15; George Stuteville, "Lugar pushes for expanded NATO," *Indianapolis Star*, September 8, 1993, p. 8; and Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugeler, and F. Scott Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 4, September-October 1993.

8. See, The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Part III, "A Broad Approach to Security"; and, Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in meeting of the North Atlantic Council, November 7-8, 1991, Press Communiqué S-1(91)86, Brussels, NATO Press Service, November 8, 1991.

9. Certainly, should numbers change so dramatically as to undermine the means of achieving the objectives of the Alliance, then strategy may have to be revisited. But this is not currently the case.

10. For background on the development of the Concept see, Michael Legge, "The Making of NATO's New Strategy," *NATO Review*, Volume 39, No. 1, December 1991, pp. 9-14.

11. This initiative was taken under the New Strategic Concept's provisions of "Protecting Peace in a New Europe" and "Management of Crisis and Conflict Prevention." Note that NATO participation in these operations will be on a case-by-case basis. Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(92)51, Brussels, NATO Press Service, June 4, 1992, point 11.

12. Speech by Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Wörner to the IISS in Brussels, September 10, 1993, p. 6.

13. Note that although Spain formally became a member of the Alliance on May 30, 1982, NATO only reached final agreement with Madrid on the final two of the six coordinating accords in 1992. See, "Endorsement of Spain/MNC Coordination Agreements," *NATO Review*, Volume 40, No. 5, October 1992, p. 32.

14. Note that Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated in late August that Russia had no reservations about Poland, the Czech Republic, or Hungary joining NATO. See, *The Washington Post*, August 27 and September 1, 1993; and, *The New York Times*, August 26 and 29, 1993.

15. Sweden, in particular, has been reexamining its policy of neutrality and its future relationship with NATO. Note that Sweden, for the first time, is participating in NATO exercises. See, *Stars and Stripes* (Europe), April 19, 1993. Stockholm apparently has also effected new operational arrangements with Norway and Finland. See, *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm), June 13, 1993 in, *FBIS-WEU-93-133*, July 14, 1993, pp. 69-71.

16. See, Asmus, *et al.*, pp. 35-36. Cf., Trevor Taylor, "NATO and Central Europe," *NATO Review*, Volume 39, No. 5, October 1991, pp. 18-19.

17. See, Jeffrey Simon, "Does Eastern Europe Belong in NATO?", *Orbis*, Volume 37, No. 1, Winter 1993, pp. 32-34.

18. *NATO Handbook*, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1992, pp. 143-144.

19. North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation, Press Communiqué M-NACC-1(91) 111(Rev), Brussels, NATO Press Service, December 20, 1991, point 1.

20. For a critique of the NACC see Simon Lunn's comments (page A25) in, *The Washington Post*, September 1, 1993.

21. Note that notwithstanding President Yeltsin's declaration that Russia would not oppose the entry of former Warsaw Pact members into NATO, the Alliance itself has been rather cool to the proposition. See, *The New York Times*, September 2, 1993.

22. Asmus, *et al.*, lay out criteria for membership in NATO: "commitment to democratic rule, civil-military reform, renunciation of all territorial claims, respect for the rights of minorities, and willingness to participate in the full range of future NATO activities from peacekeeping to collective defense," p. 35. Our political criteria are taken from the Preamble, and Articles 2 and 3 of the *North Atlantic Treaty*, April 4, 1949. Military criteria illustrate the many and varied requirements that nations would be expected to undertake as an expression of their commitment to the Alliance.

23. NATO Press Communiqué M-DPC/NPG-1 (91) 38, May 29, 1991, point 9.

24. Dierk Weissleder, "NATO's Future Force Structures," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, December 1991, p. 21.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 21. Within the Southern Region, for example, larger numbers of active forces would be supplemented by smaller numbers of mobilizable units. In the Central Region, on the other hand, Main Defense Forces would consist of largely conscript and reserve formations with longer mobilization times than was previously the case during the cold war.

26. For example, Norway would continue to rely on nearly total mobilization; most Central Region nations would retain a moderate active duty component, while relying on sizeable mobilized formations; and Turkey would retain large numbers of active duty, conscripted personnel with limited mobilization.

27. Norway, for example, had little room to reduce forces beyond its already small levels. Within the Southern Region, Spain and Italy plan relatively large reductions, Portugal moderate reductions to its already small forces, Greece will take little or no reductions, and Turkey will reduce significantly personnel strengths, but will increase items of modern



equipment. See, *Military Trends*, Congressional Research Service, 1992, *passim*.

28. For an excellent description and analysis of NATO's new force structure and command organization see, Christian Tuschhoff, "The Political Consequences of NATO Armed Forces Reforms," unpublished paper, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Washington, DC, Spring 1993, reprinted in *FBIS-WEU-93-121-S*, June 25, 1993, pp. 1-8.

29. See, "JDW Interview, General John Galvin," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, June 29, 1991, p. 1196; and, Roy Wilde, "Multinational Forces—Integration for National Security," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, December 1991, p. 26.

30. Weissleder, p. 21.

31. Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group, Press Communique M-DPC/NPG-1(93)36, Brussels, NATO Press Service, May 26, 1993, point 8.

32. As reported in, *La Liberation* (Paris), May 28, 1993.

33. Defense Planning Committee, Communique M-DPC-2(92)102, Brussels, NATO Press Service, December 11, 1992, point 9.

34. "Consequently, capabilities for timely reinforcement and resupply both within Europe and from North America will be of critical importance." Moreover, the New Strategic Concept stipulates that "The Allies will maintain military strength adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use of force against the territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and effective action *by all of them* ...." [emphasis added] The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Press Communique S-1(19)85, November 7, 1991, points 47(b) and 36, respectively.

35. See, *Knack* (Brussels), June 30-July 6, 1993, in *FBIS-WEU-93-134*, July 15, 1993, p. 22; and, Joris Janssen Lok, "Army to Feel Conscript Cuts," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, January 30, 1993, p. 18.

36. *NATO: Facts and Figures*, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989, pp. 214-224; Bruce George, ed., *Jane's NATO Handbook, 1989-1990*, Surrey, UK: Jane's Information Group, Ltd., 1989, pp. 83-84; and, 1200/SHPPP/88, "Conceptual Military Framework (CMF) Documents as part of the Overall Defence Planning Framework," (NATO Unclassified), December 1988.

37. *Ibid.*

38. For example, France, notwithstanding its extensive overseas defense commitments, is legally limited in the deployment of conscript soldiers. It is little wonder, therefore, that many European allied states are either discussing the termination of conscription (e.g., Federal Republic of Germany and France), or have already done so (i.e., the Netherlands).

39. For example, Belgium, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany.

40. This methodology is based upon the procedures developed by the Australian Department of Defence. For a description and analysis of this planning system see, Thomas-Durell Young, *Threat-Ambiguous Defense Planning: The Australian Experience*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 10, 1993.

41. This is a classified document; however, an unclassified précis is available in, *BASIC Reports on European Arms Control*, No. 20, February 19, 1992, pp. 6-7.

42. For a brief discussion of this process, see The Armed Forces Staff College, AFSC Publication 1, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide*, 1993 ed., Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 5-9 to 5-10.

43. For example, note the resultant clamor in the U.S. press when illustrative Pentagon planning scenarios were published in *The New York Times*. See, *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* during the week of February 17, 1992, and March 8, 1992. The specific article that began the controversy is, Patrick E. Tyler, "Pentagon Imagines New Enemies to Fight in Post-Cold-War Era," *The New York Times*, February 17, 1992.

44. The interests outlined in the following paragraphs are derived from *National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1990, pp. 2-3.

45. An excellent example of how such a process might work is in Colonel (USAF) James Soligan, "U.S. Forces in Europe: Where Do We Go From Here?," *Comparative Strategy*, Volume 11, 1992, pp. 475-501.

46. For early details on this reorganization see, Thomas-Durell Young and William T. Johnsen, "Reforming NATO's Command and Operational Control Structures: Progress and Problems," *PSIS Occasional Papers*, No. 3, Geneva: Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1992.

47. See, "New Shape for ACE," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, July 17, 1993, p. 17. AFNORTHWEST was established effective July 1, 1993. BALTAP

will be transferred to AFCENT on January 1, 1994. *Ibid.* See also, *Stars and Stripes* (Europe), May 29, 1992.

48. RADM B. Johnson, Canadian Navy, DCOS Operations to the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, "Crisis Management and Containment—Deterrence, Coercion, and the Protection of Non-Belligerents (including Mine Countermeasures and NCS Procedures)," paper presented to the conference, "The Role of Naval Forces in the Management and Containment of Regional Crises," Halifax, N.S., Dalhousie University, June 24-26, 1993, p. 7.

49. For background on the political controversy over the creation of AFNORTHWEST and the public acrimony surrounding the question of whether a German or British general would command the ARRC, see, Young and Johnsen, pp. 12-17; 22.

50. "New Shape for ACE," p. 17.

51. See, *Defense News* (Washington, DC), December 9, 1991.

52. A new border between AFNORTHWEST and AFCENT should be established in the Baltic, perhaps between the Skagerrak and Kattegat. Establishment of Headquarters, NAVCENT is not without precedent. Originally established as FLAGCENT in 1952, Allied Naval Forces Central Europe existed through 1962. *NATO Handbook*, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1952-1963.

53. This requirement in itself argues against standing down LANDCENT and AIRCENT as "redundant" headquarters in a threat-benign region of ACE. These headquarters are ideally suited for this important mission.

54. For background on this see, Gordon Ferguson, "NATO's New Concept of Reinforcement," *NATO Review*, Volume 40, No. 5, October 1992, pp. 31-34.

55. It should be noted that numerous allied countries not bordering the Mediterranean have seconded liaison personnel to HQ AFSOUTH, e.g., the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada and the Netherlands.

56. French policy, albeit at glacial speed, is adopting a more constructive approach to NATO in general. See, *Le Monde* (Paris), March 12, 1993; and, May 14, 1993. Whether this will be translated into action in the Southern Region, however, remains to be seen.

57. See "Exclusive AFJI interview with: Gen. Sir Jeremy Mackenzie," *Armed Forces Journal International*, April 1993, p. 25; and, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, April 25, 1992, p. 689.

58. See, Johnson, pp. 10-11.

59. This point is well argued by François Heisbourg and Pierre Lellouche in, *Le Monde* (Paris), June 17, 1993.

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